Sequential Mechanisms with Ex Post Individual Rationality
We study optimal mechanisms for selling multiple products to a buyer who learns her values for those products sequentially. A mechanism may use static prices or adjust them over time, and it may se…
Technical Note—Assortment Planning for Two-Sided Sequential Matching Markets
Two-sided matching platforms provide users with menus of match recommendations. To maximize the number of realized matches between the two sides (referred to herein as customers and suppliers), the…
Kidney Exchange : An Operations Perspective
Many patients in need of a kidney transplant have a willing but incompatible (or poorly matched) living donor. Kidney exchange programs arrange exchanges among such patient-donor pairs, in cycles a…
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