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Shareholder Litigation and Corporate Innovation

We investigate whether and to what extent shareholder litigation shapes corporate innovation by examining the staggered adoption of universal demand laws in 23 states from 1989 to 2005. These laws impose obstacles against shareholders filing derivative lawsuits, thereby significantly reducing managers’ litigation risk. Using a difference-in-differences design and a matched sample, we find that, following the passage of the laws, firms invested more in research and development, produced more patents in new technological classes and more patents based on new knowledge, generated more patents with significant impacts, and achieved higher patent value. Our findings suggest that the external pressure imposed by shareholder litigation discourages managers from engaging in explorative innovation activities.

Ketersediaan

Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE; Vol.67 No.6 June 2021

No. Panggil

-

Penerbit

: .,

Deskripsi Fisik

p. 3346 - 3367

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

-

Klasifikasi

-

Tipe Isi

-

Tipe Media

-

Tipe Pembawa

-

Edisi

-

Subjek

PATENTS
INNOVATION
SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION
DERIVATIVE LAWSUIT

Info Detail Spesifik

https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3626

Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

Chen Lin, Sibo Liu, Gustavo Manso

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