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Finite-State Contract Theory with a Principal and a Field of Agents

We use the recently developed probabilistic analysis of mean field games with finitely many states in the weak formulation to set up a principal/agent contract theory model where the principal faces a large population of agents interacting in a mean field manner. We reduce the problem to the optimal control of dynamics of the McKean-Vlasov type, and we solve this problem explicitly for a class of models with concave rewards. The paper concludes with a numerical example demonstrating the power of the results when applied to an example of epidemic containment.

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Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE; Vol.67 No.8 August 2021

No. Panggil

-

Penerbit

: .,

Deskripsi Fisik

p. 4725-4741

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

-

Klasifikasi

NONE

Tipe Isi

-

Tipe Media

-

Tipe Pembawa

-

Edisi

-

Subjek

EPIDEMIC CONTROL
MEAN FIELD GAME
PRINCIPAL AGENT PROBLEM

Info Detail Spesifik

-

Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

René Carmona, Peiqi Wang

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