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Asymmetric Reporting Timeliness and Informational Feedback

We examine the effects of asymmetric timeliness in reporting good versus bad news on price informativeness when prices provide useful information to assist firms’ investment decisions. We find that a reporting system featuring more timely disclosure of bad news than of good news encourages speculators to trade on their private information. Consequently, it generates a higher expected investment level and firm value. Our analysis generates predictions consistent with empirical findings and provides a justification for the more timely reporting of bad news in the absence of managerial incentive problems.

Ketersediaan

Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE; Vol.67 No.8 August 2021

No. Panggil

-

Penerbit

: .,

Deskripsi Fisik

p. 5194-5208

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

-

Klasifikasi

NONE

Tipe Isi

-

Tipe Media

-

Tipe Pembawa

-

Edisi

-

Subjek

PRICE INFORMATIVENESS
TIMELY LOSS RECOGNITION
FEEDBACK EFFECT

Info Detail Spesifik

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Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

Qi Chen, Zeqiong Huang, Xu Jiang, Gaoqing Zhang, Yun Zhang

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