Text

Competitive Investment with Bayesian Learning : Choice of Business Size and Timing

Motivated by the challenges faced by firms entering an unknown market, we study a strategic investment problem in a duopoly setting. The favorableness of the market is unknown to both firms, but firms have prior information about it. A leader invests first by choosing its investment size. Then, in a continuous-time Bayesian setting, a competitive follower dynamically learns about the favorableness of the market by observing the leader’s earnings and chooses its investment size and timing. In this setting, we characterize equilibrium strategies of firms. A distinctive feature of our model is that firms choose their investment sizes, and thus the follower’s observations about the favorableness of the market can be censored due to the leader’s investment size choice. It is generally accepted that if there is an increase in the likelihood of a favorable market, then the firm’s expected discounted profit and its investment size increase. Our paper shows that, contrary to this common understanding, the leader’s equilibrium expected discounted profit and equilibrium investment size can strictly decrease when there is an increase in the likelihood of a favorable market. This is due to a nontrivial interplay between the leader’s investment size decision and the follower’s investment strategy.

Ketersediaan

Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

OPERATIONS RESEARCH; Vol.69 No.5 September-October 2021

No. Panggil

-

Penerbit

: .,

Deskripsi Fisik

p. 1430-1449

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

-

Klasifikasi

NONE

Tipe Isi

-

Tipe Media

-

Tipe Pembawa

-

Edisi

-

Subjek

COMPETITION
OPTIMAL STOPPING
BAYESIAN LEARNING
INVESTMENT SIZE
INVESTMENT TIMING

Info Detail Spesifik

-

Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

Nur Sunar, Siyun Yu, Vidyadhar G. Kulkarni

Versi lain/terkait

Lampiran Berkas

Komentar