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Terminal Ranking Games

We analyze a mean field tournament: a mean field game in which the agents receive rewards according to the ranking of the terminal value of their projects and are subject to cost of effort. Using Schrödinger bridges we are able to explicitly calculate the equilibrium. This allows us to identify the reward functions which would yield a desired equilibrium and solve several related mechanism design problems. We are also able to identify the effect of reward inequality on the players’ welfare as well as calculate the price of anarchy.

Ketersediaan

Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH; Vol.46 No.4 November 2021

No. Panggil

-

Penerbit

: .,

Deskripsi Fisik

p. 1349-1365

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

-

Klasifikasi

NONE

Tipe Isi

-

Tipe Media

-

Tipe Pembawa

-

Edisi

-

Subjek

PRICE OF ANARCHY
MECHANISM DESIGN
TOURNAMENTS
RANK-BASED REWARDS
MAEN FIELD GAMES
SCHRODINGER BRIDGES
LORENZ ORDER

Info Detail Spesifik

https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2020.1107

Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

Erhan Bayraktar, Yuchong Zhang

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