Text

Insider Trading, Competition, and Real Activities Manipulation

We consider a setting where managers manipulate the firms’ real activities in anticipation of insider trading opportunities. Managers choose strictly higher production quantities than the quantities chosen absent insider trading, implying lower firm profit but higher consumer surplus. Through comparative statics, we show the overproduction is mitigated by the degree of competition in the industry, the manager’s current equity stake in the firm, and the precision of cost information. We also analyze the effects of insider trading in several extensions including asymmetric ownership structure, potential horizontal merger, and common market maker.

Ketersediaan

Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE; Vol.68 No.2 February 2022

No. Panggil

-

Penerbit

: .,

Deskripsi Fisik

p. 1497-1511

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

-

Klasifikasi

NONE

Tipe Isi

-

Tipe Media

-

Tipe Pembawa

-

Edisi

-

Subjek

INSIDER TRADING
PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION
REAL ACTIVITIES MANIPULATION
OVERPRODUCTION

Info Detail Spesifik

https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3915

Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

Hui Chen, Bjorn N. Jorgensen

Versi lain/terkait

Lampiran Berkas

Komentar