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Efficient certificate verification for vehicle-to-grid communications

While public charging stations are typically used for Electric Vehicle (EV) such as charging, home microgrids that may act as private charging stations are also expected to be used for meeting the increased EV charging demands in the future. Such home microgrids can be accessible through their smart meters, which makes advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) a viable alternative for vehicle-to-grid (V2G) communications. However, to ensure secure V2G communications using public-keys, smart meters will need to maintain certificate revocation lists (CRLs) not just for the AMI network but also for large number of EVs that may interact with them. For resource-constrained smart meters, this will increase the storage requirements and introduce additional overhead in terms of delay and CRL maintenance. To eliminate this burden, we propose keeping merely non-revoked certificates that belong to EVs, which are usually driven within the vicinity of that particular microgrid. The motivation comes from the fact that it is inefficient to distribute and store a large CRL that has revocation information about all EVs in the whole system as most of these EVs will never come to the geographic vicinity of that home microgrid. The approach ensures that any status changes of these certificates are communicated to the smart meters. We implemented the proposed approach in a realistic V2G communication scenario by using IEEE 802.11s mesh as the underlying AMI infrastructure using ns-3 simulator. The results confirmed that the proposed approach significantly reduces the certificate verification time and the storage requirements on smart meters.

Ketersediaan

Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

No. Panggil

-

Penerbit

: IEEE., 2017

Deskripsi Fisik

p. 3-18

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

978-3-319-65547-5

Klasifikasi

NONE

Tipe Isi

-

Tipe Media

-

Tipe Pembawa

-

Edisi

-

Subjek

-

Info Detail Spesifik

Makalah dipresentasikan pada International Conference on Future Network Systems and Security 2017 (FNSS 2017). September 2017. p. 3-18.

Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

Nico Saputro, Samet Tonyali, Kemal Akkaya, Mumin Cebe1, Mohamed Mahmoud

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