Uncommon Knowledge in Multiparty Auctions | PERPUSTAKAAN UNIVERSITAS KATOLIK PARAHYANGAN

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Uncommon Knowledge in Multiparty Auctions

Banks, David - Nama Orang; Guo, Yi - Nama Orang;

The pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) solution to multiparty auctions makes the strong but unrealistic assumption that all participants share the same beliefs about the type distributions of the others, and that all know that this information is mutually known. This paper proposes two alternative analyses of such auction problems that do not make that presupposition. The first is based on a solution concept similar to the PSNE. The second is employs the level k thinking solution concept.

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Barcode		Tipe Koleksi	Nomor Panggil	Lokasi	Status
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Informasi Detail

Judul Seri: DECISION ANALYSIS; Vol.19 No.3 September 2022
No. Panggil: -
Penerbit: : .,
Deskripsi Fisik: p. 220-228
Bahasa: English
ISBN/ISSN: -
Klasifikasi: NONE
Tipe Isi: -
Tipe Media: -
Tipe Pembawa: -
Edisi: -
Subjek: BAYESIAN METHODS
ADVERSARIAL RISK ANALYSIS
ASYMMETRIC AUCTIONS
FIRST-PRICE AUCTIONS
LEVEL & THINKING
PURE STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIA
Info Detail Spesifik: https://doi.org/10.1287/deca.2022.0454
Pernyataan Tanggungjawab: David Banks, Yi Guo

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