Text

Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Sequential Quantity-Price Games

This paper develops an oligopoly model in which firms first choose capacity and then compete in prices in a series of advance-purchase markets. We show that the existence of multiple sales opportunities creates strong competitive forces that prevent firms from utilizing intertemporal price discrimination. We then show that intertemporal price discrimination is possible but only when firms adopt inventory controls (sales limit restrictions) and demand becomes more inelastic over time. Therefore, we show that in addition to being useful to manage demand uncertainty, inventory controls are also a tool to soften price competition. We discuss model extensions, including product differentiation, aggregate demand uncertainty, and longer sales horizons.

Ketersediaan

Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

MARKETING SCIENCE; Vol.41 No.5 September-October 2022

No. Panggil

-

Penerbit

: .,

Deskripsi Fisik

p. 538-553

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

-

Klasifikasi

NONE

Tipe Isi

-

Tipe Media

-

Tipe Pembawa

-

Edisi

-

Subjek

GAME THEORY
PRICING
COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS
SEGMENTATION

Info Detail Spesifik

https://doi.org/10.1287/mksc.2021.1345

Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

James D. Dana Jr., Kevin R. Williams

Versi lain/terkait

Lampiran Berkas

Komentar