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Delegated Concept Testing in New Product Development

Testing a large variety of different product concepts is an integral part of nearly all new product development initiatives—especially in the concept selection phase, where firms seek to identify the most promising concept for further development. Test results are usually collected by agents, who must be incentivized not only to exert effort in testing the concepts but also to report their findings truthfully. We ask: How should a firm structure its concept testing processes when testing efforts must be delegated to self-interested agents? To answer this question, we devise a principal–(multi)agent model that allows us to analyze different testing processes and to compare their relative benefits. We find that several factors determine how the firm should construct its testing processes: the efficiency of concept testing, the extent of heterogeneity in the quality of test outcomes, and the severity of information asymmetry between agents and the firm. Finally, we determine how the firm should adjust agents’ incentives to reflect its chosen testing process and which product concepts should (or should not) be tested.

Ketersediaan

Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

OPERATIONS RESEARCH; Vol.70 No.5 September-October 2022

No. Panggil

-

Penerbit

: .,

Deskripsi Fisik

p. 2732-2748

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

-

Klasifikasi

NONE

Tipe Isi

-

Tipe Media

-

Tipe Pembawa

-

Edisi

-

Subjek

INCENTIVES
RESOURCE ALLOCATION
INFORMATION ACQUISITION
PROJECT SELECTION
SEARCH THEORY

Info Detail Spesifik

https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2022.2318

Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

Jochen Schlapp, Gerrit Schumacher

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