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Continuous Patrolling Games

We study a patrolling game played on a network Q, considered as a metric space. The Attacker chooses a point of Q (not necessarily a node) to attack during a chosen time interval of fixed duration. The Patroller chooses a unit speed path on Q and intercepts the attack (and wins) if she visits the attacked point during the attack-time interval. This zero-sum game models the problem of protecting roads or pipelines from an adversarial attack. The payoff to the maximizing Patroller is the probability that the attack is intercepted. Our results include the following: (i) a solution to the game for any network Q, as long as the time required to carry out the attack is sufficiently short; (ii) a solution to the game for all tree networks that satisfy a certain condition on their extremities; and (iii) a solution to the game for any attack duration for stars with one long arc and the remaining arcs equal in length. We present a conjecture on the solution of the game for arbitrary trees and establish it in certain cases.

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Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

OPERATIONS RESEARCH; Vol.70 No.6 November-December 2022

No. Panggil

-

Penerbit

: .,

Deskripsi Fisik

p. 3076-3089

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

-

Klasifikasi

NONE

Tipe Isi

-

Tipe Media

-

Tipe Pembawa

-

Edisi

-

Subjek

NETWORKS
ZERO-SUM GAMES
PATROLLING

Info Detail Spesifik

https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.2022.2346

Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

Steve Alpern, Thuy Bui, Thomas Lidbetter, Katerina Papadaki

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