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Shareholder Short-Termism, Corporate Control and Voluntary Disclosure

This paper examines how a manager uses voluntary disclosure to influence corporate control by a short-term shareholder. Because a short-term shareholder intervenes excessively, the manager’s disclosure strategy is determined by the trade-off between excessive and insufficient intervention. In equilibrium, when shareholder short-termism is not too high, the manager discloses both good and bad news and withholds intermediate news. Alternatively, when shareholder short-termism is high, the manager only discloses good news and withholds bad news. In both equilibria, withholding information is value-enhancing for the nondisclosing firms. We also show that the likelihood of disclosure weakly decreases as the shareholder is more short-term-oriented. Moreover, nondisclosing firms are more likely to face shareholder intervention than disclosing firms.

Ketersediaan

Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

MANAGEMENT SCIENCE; Vol.69 No.1 January 2023

No. Panggil

-

Penerbit

: .,

Deskripsi Fisik

p. 702-721

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

-

Klasifikasi

NONE

Tipe Isi

-

Tipe Media

-

Tipe Pembawa

-

Edisi

-

Subjek

INTERVENTION
MANAGERIAL MYOPIA
VOLUNTARY DISCLOSURE
ACTIVE SHAREHOLDER
SHAREHOLDER SHORT-TERMISM

Info Detail Spesifik

https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.4357

Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

Xue Jia, Rahul Menon

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