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The Edgeworth Conjecture with Small Coalitions and Approximate Equilibria in Large Economies

We revisit the connection between bargaining and equilibrium in exchange economies and study its algorithmic implications. We consider bargaining outcomes to be allocations that cannot be blocked (i.e., profitably retraded) by coalitions of small size, and show that these allocations must be approximate Walrasian equilibria. Our results imply that deciding whether an allocation is approximately Walrasian can be done in polynomial time, even in economies for which finding an equilibrium is known to be computationally hard.

Ketersediaan

Informasi Detail

Judul Seri

MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH; Vol.48 No.1 February 2023

No. Panggil

-

Penerbit

: .,

Deskripsi Fisik

p. 288-312

Bahasa

English

ISBN/ISSN

-

Klasifikasi

NONE

Tipe Isi

-

Tipe Media

-

Tipe Pembawa

-

Edisi

-

Subjek

TIME-MONOTONE PROCESS

Info Detail Spesifik

https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2022.1263

Pernyataan Tanggungjawab

Siddharth Barman, Federico Echenique

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