We develop an analytical framework to study experimental design in two-sided marketplaces. Many of these experiments exhibit interference, where an intervention applied to one market participant in…
A/B tests are typically analyzed via frequentist p-values and confidence intervals, but these inferences are wholly unreliable if users endogenously choose samples sizes by continuously monitoring …
Consider a queueing system consisting of multiple servers. Jobs arrive over time and enter a queue for service; the goal is to minimize the size of this queue. At each opportunity for service, at m…
Problem definition: Platforms critically rely on rating systems to learn the quality of market participants. In practice, however, ratings are often highly inflated and therefore, not very informat…
Problem definition: Participants in matching markets face search and screening costs when seeking a match. We study how platform design can reduce the effort required to find a suitable partner. Pr…
We consider the problem faced by a service platform that needs to match limited supply with demand while learning the attributes of new users to match them better in the future. We introduce a benc…